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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Statement of the Case
This appeal raises a question of the proper construction of Section 100-5-1, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, as.l!mended by C. 105, Laws of Utah, 1935, which
section provides for appointment of water commissioners
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by the State Engineer and authorizes the State Engineer
to levy and collect assessments to pay the expenses of
such commissioners. Two proceedings were instituted
by the State Engineer to collect water assessments aggregating $375.32 which were levied against a water
right on the Jordan River owned by the White Fawn
Milling Corporation. Decisions adverse to the contention
of the State Engineer were rendered in both cases and
appeals were taken to this -court. The two appeals were,
by order of this court, consolidated for the purpose of
hearing.

Louis L. Marks v. White Fawn Milling Corporation
Case No. 6229
During the years 1937, 1938, and part of 1939, the
White Fawn Milling Corporation was the owner of a
right to use water of the Jordan River for milling purposes. The water to which the Milling Company was entitled was distributed during those years by a water
commissioner appointed by the State Engineer pursuant
to the provisions of Section 100-5-1, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, and assessments against the claimant were
levied by the State Engineer in order to pay the salary
and expenses of the commissioner. The prorata share
charged against the White Fawn Milling Corporation
was $142.40 for 1937; $120.96 for 1938; ·and $111.96 for
193"9. The assessments were levied on or ·about M~a-y 1
of each year, as provided ~by the statute.
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3
On June 10, 1939 the Third Judicial District Court
of this State appointed Walker Bank & Trust Company
as Receiver to take over all of the assets of the White
Fawn ~Iilling Corporation, and thereafter notice was
given requiring creditors to file claims on or before August 13, 1939. On June 21, 1939 the State Engineer filed
his claim for the assessments mentioned above, claiming
preference for such claim under the provisions of Title
100, Revised St~tutes of Utah, 1933. In a petition for
approval, allowance of claims, disallowance of claims,
and authority to pay dividends, the Receiver alleged that
the property of the "\Vhite Fawn 1Iilling Corporation,
including its right to the use of the waters of the Jordan
River, had been sold and that it had received as proceeds
of such sale approximately $10,000. The claims are listed
in the petition, and it is alleged that the claim of T. H.
Humpherys as State Engineer covering said assessments
should be denied as a preferred claim but allowed as a
common claim. The appellant made a timely objection
in writing to that part of the petition in which the Re~
ceiver recommended denial of the claim as a preferred
claim, and at the time of hearing of the petition appeared
before the court in support of its objection. The court,
nevertheless, under date of December 22, 1939, by order adopted the recommendations of the Receiver and
disallowed the appellant's claim as a preferred clairn
but allo,ved it as a common claim. Common creditors
were paid only 25 per cent of their claims. Appellant
assigns as error the making and entering of such order.
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4
T. H. 1-lumphreys v. Maxfield Feed & Coal,
Incorporated
Case No. 6287
On March 16, 1940, the State Engineer brought suit
against Maxfield Feed & Coal, Incorporated, a corporation, purchaser of the White Fawn property, including
its water rights, from the Receiver, seeking to restrain
it from using water from Jordan River until the delinquencies mentioned above had been paid. It is alleged in
the complaint that the State Engineer notified the defendant to pay all delinquencies forthwith or it would be
forbidden the use of water from Jordan River, as provided by Section 100-5-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
but that nevertheless the defendant has refused to pay
such delinquencies, and, unless restrained by the court,
the defendant will continue to use the water of Jordan
River without paying delinquent water assessments. To
this action the defendant answered, admitting that
that assessments were levied against its predecessors,
denying that it had assumed the obligation to pay past
assessments by purchasing the White Fawn water right,
and allegjng that the State Engineer filed his claim for
water assessments with the Receiver of the Milling Company, that the claim was. disallowed as a preferred claim
but was allowed as a common claim, and that the Receiver had paid to defendant as a dividend 25 per cent
of its claim which amounted to $93.83. It is further
alleged in the answer that the water right in question
was conveyed to the defendant by means of a recel.ver's
deed, which is attached to the answer as Exhibit "A".
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The case "\Vas tried on the pleadings and upon a
stipulation of facts. It \vas admitted by the defendant
in open court that the assessments mentioned in the
complaint were duly levied by the State Engineer prior
to the receivership and prior to the transfer to Maxfield Feed & Coal, Incorporated, and that the amounts
set forth in the complaint were correct. It was admitted
by the plaintiff that he had filed a claim for $375.32
with the Receiver covering the water assessments in
question and that the claim was disallowed as a preferred claim but was allowed as a common claim, and
that the Receiver paid a dividend on the claim, but that
such dividend was accepted by the State Engineer upon
a written stipulation that it would not prejudice his
rights to pursue his claim as a preferred clain1. The
court made findings of fact in ccordance with the stipulation of the parties, concluded that the plaintiff was
entitled to no relief, and entered a decree dismissing
the suit. The appellant assigned as error the conclusion
of la\v and the decree.

Argument
It will be observed that the State Engineer has by
this litigation attempted collection of delinquent water
assessments from both the seller and the buyer. It is his
contention that he is entitled to payment of his claim,
either by the Receiver from the proceeds of the sale or by
the transferee of the water right, or he is entitled to a
judgrnent enforcing his order forbidding the use of
water until the water assessments are paid in full. The
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question in both cases is primarily one "of statutory construction. Section 100-5-1 provides in part as follows:
"Whenever in the judgment of the state engineer
or the distirct court, it is necessary to appoint one
or more water commissioners for the distribution of water from any river system or water
source, such commissioner or commissioners sha11
be appointed annually by the state engineer, after
consultation with the water users. The form of
such consultation and notice to be given shall be
determined by the state engineer as shall best suit
local conditions, full expression of majority opinion being_, however, provided for. If a majority
of the water users, as a result of such consultation, shall ag:r:ee upon some competent person or
persons to be appointed as water commissioner or
commissioners, the duties he or they shall perform
and the compensation he or they shall receive, and
shall make recommendations to the state engineer
as to such matters or either of them, the state
engineer shall act in accordance with their recommendations; but if a majority of water users do
not agree as to such matters, then the state engineer shall make a determination for them. The
salary and expenses of such commissioner or commissioners shall be borne pro rata by the users
of water from such river system or water source,
upon a schedule to be fixed by the state engineer,
based on the established rights of each water
user, and such prorata share shall be paid by each
water user to the state engineer in advance on
or before the first day of May each year, and
u_pon failure so to do the state engineer may
forbid the use of water by any such delinquent
while such default continues, and may bring an
action in the district co:urt for such unpaid e~.~
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pense and salary, or the district court having
jurisdiction of his person n1ay issue an order to
show cause upon any delinquent user why a
judgment for such sum should not be entered. Any
such commissioner or commissioners may be removed by the state engineer for cause. The users
of water fron1 any river system or water source
may petition the district court for the removal of
any such commissioner or commissioners, and
after notice and hearing the court may order the
removal of such commissioner or commissioners
and direct the state engineer to appoint successors
as necessary. ' '
Under familiar rules of statutory construction, the
courts must determine the intent and purpose of the
legislature in enacting the law and, if necessary, must
liberally construe the statute to effect that purpose. Secion 88-2-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides:
"The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has
no application to the statutes of this state. The
statutes established the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings under them
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. vVhenever there is any variance between
the rules of equity and the rules of common law
in reference to the same matter the rules of
equity shall prevail.''
See also to the same effect Baker v. Latse.s, 60 Utah 38,
206 P. 553; Utah Association of Life Underwriters v.
Mountain States Insurance Company, 58 Utah 579, 200
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P. 673 ; Houston Real _Estate 0 ompany v. Hechler, 44
Utah 64, 138 P. 1159; State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15,
245 P. 375; State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 226 P. 674;
Board of Education of Carbon Oottnty School District
v. Bryner, 57 Utah 78, 192 P. 627; see' large number of
cases collected, 59 C. J. 973; 59 C. J. 1129.
It is a fundamental concept of the water law of Utah
and other western States that water in its natural source
is the property of the public. This concept has been
declared by the legislature many times both before and
after statehood. Water in a natural source can never
be privately o'vned even by the State or the United
States. All that can be ac.quired is a right of use. The
legislature has prescribed conditions under which water
may be appropriated and used and conditions under
which water rights are terminated. One condition to
enjoyment of such rights which found its way into the
law before any legislation on the subject makes necessary
a continuous b~neficial use of water.
If any person entitled to the use of 'vater shall, for
a period of five years, fail to put the water so claimed
to a beneficial use, the right of use ceases. It is immaterial whether the right reverts to the State or accrues
to other appropriators; the fact is that the right of the
delinquent is terminated. In a like manner, if the owner
of the right of use fails to pay the duly and legally levied
assessment of the State Engineer for the distribution
of water, his right may be terminated during the period
of such delinquency.
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It cannot be logically contended that the mere trans ..
fer of title. can revive this right. The only method of re.
viving the right is to pay the assessment. This burden
must be borne by the- one who would exercise the right,
whether it be the one who claimed the water vvhen the
assessment was levied.or a transferee thereafte.r.
Assume that instead of authorizing the State Engineer to levy assessments, as provided by the statute,
in order to cover the cost of the service by the State
Engineer, the legislature should provide for the levying
of a tax upon the use of water. Under such procedure,
it would be obvious that the owner of the water could not
free the water from the· tax merely by deeding his water
away. Under the law, where a farm is sold for delinquent
taxes, the water right appurtenant to the farm is impressed with the lien of the tax and passes upon the
tax sale with the land.
The assessments made by the State Engineer in
many respects are like a special tax. We respectfully
urge that these assessments are impressed upon the property itself, and follow it into the hands of successive.
claimants. If this be true, the lien or condition. precedent
to the continued use of the water cannot be discharged
by any payment of a prorata part of the assessment, but
the right is restored only, as in the case of a tax, by
the payment in full of the amount due.
The objects and purposes of the section of the statute under consideration may be gathered fron). the whole
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of Title 100, which relates to water and irrigation. Section 100-2-1 authorizes the Governor to appoint a State
Engineer and, among other things, provides that the
State Engineer shall distribute the waters of the State
to those entitled thereto according to the administration
and distribution of water and sets up an orderly procedure based on democratic principles for the appointment of water commissioners. It prescribes the _duties
of such commissioners and, necessarily, provides for payment of expenses by those to be benefited.
•,

It is apparent the legislature intended that (1) water
is to be distributed by public officers, to wit: the State
Engineer and his commissioners; ( 2) such commissioners
must be appointed after consultation with the water users
in accordance with the wishes of the majority; (3) commissioners must be paid by those benefited, namely, the
water users; and ( 4) the plan of payment for the
services of the commissioners contemplates collection of
assessments by the State Engineer as an agent of the
users. To enforce payment, the State Engineer is authorizd to forbid the use of water by any such delinquent
while the default continues, and he may bring an action
in the district court for such unpaid expense and salary,
of the district court, having jurisdiction of the person of
the water user, and may issue an order against any delinquent user requiring him to show cause why judgment
for such sums should not be entered.
The legislature intended by the language used to
give the State Engineer two remedies one in rem and
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one in personam. Upon breach of the condition requiring
payment of expense of distribution he may deny the use
of water. It should be noted in this connection that there
is no language to the effect that the first remedy is applicable only when the water right is owned by the person
against "vhom the assessment was levied. The statute
gives the State Engineer unlimited and unqualified authority to forbid the use of water until delinquencie.s are
paid.
If the language of the statute is construed in accordance with the intention of the legislature, and it must be
and, if it is construed liberally to make effective the
powers granted to the State Engineer to collect water
assessments, the court must hold that the law giving
the State Engineer the right to forbid the use of the water
to enforce collection imposes some 'S-ort of a statutory
charge or condition upon a water right which cannot be
defeated by mere assignment or transfer of the right.
If payment of a water assessment may be so easily defeated, an insolvent water user could simply transfer his
water right around the family or among friends every
year and avoid payment. If assessments do not follow
the right, the State Engineer could not successfully
forbid the use of water by the assignee of the right, and
the object and purpose of the statute to make collection
of water assessments as e-ffectual as possible would be
circumvented.
As stated above, the statute requires all water users
to share the expense of water commissioners upon a pro-
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rata basis. If the obligation against the water may be
disposed ·of by assignment, other users from the san1e
source must make up deficiencies resulting therefrom.
The State Engineer must in such case make a new levy
to pay bills which were successfully avoided by transfer.
The court has already had under consideration the
question as to whether the State Engineer in collecting
water assessments must proceed against one who by contract assumed the obligation to pay assessments instead
or against the water user directly liable. In the case of
Minersville Reservoir & Irrigation Company v. Rocky
Ford Irrigation Company, 90 Utah 283, 61 P. (2d) 605,
the court made the following remarks which are pertinent
here:
''Plaintiff is a water user of Beaver river and
as such is clearly liable to the state engineer for
the pa)lllent of its pro-rated share of expenses
incident to the services rendered by the water commissioner. Plaintiff may not escape that liability
to the state engineer so long as it remains a water
user. The right of the state engineer to collect
assessments from the water user cannot be defeated by an attempt of the "\Vater user to assign
its liability for the payment thereof to another.
The burden of the liability is· not so easy to
escape. If it were, all of the water users of a
stream or other source of supply might assign
their liability to pay water assessments to so1ne
irresponsible person and thus render collection
impossible .
"lt is plaintiff's contention that an assessment
made by the· state ·engineer on its water right is
· an encui-nbrance:thereon or when not paid becomes

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
such 'vithin the n1eaning of the contract. The defendant contends to the contrary. Each of the
parties have cited cases and texts dealing with
incnntbrances. \V e have examined these cases and
texts but find then1 of little aid to us in the present injury. Generally speaking, an ''incumbrance''
is a burden or charge on property. In a sense an
~tnpa,id U'ater assessment becomes an incumbrance
against the water right when the state engineer
refuses to deliver the water because the assessment is not pa~id. R. S. 1933, 100-5-1, vests in the
state engineer, in the event the assessments are
not paid, authority to "forbid the use of water
by any such delinquent while such default con
tinned,'' or he may bring an action in the distriet
court for unpaid expenses and salary, or the district court, having jurisdiction of the person, may
issue an order directing a delinquent user to show
cause why a judgment for such sum should. not
he entered against hi1n. If. the language relied
upon by plaintiff is given the broad meaning contended for, it would follo\v· that the defendant
would be obligated to pay an incumbrance placed
on its \Vater right by the plaintiff itself. That such
was not the intention of the parties is not open
to doubt. If we are correct in the view heretofore
expressed in this opinion that plaintiff owes a
duty which it rnay· .not escape to pay the state
engineer the asses~n1_ent .levied against its water
right, it follows that plaintiff ·may not be heard to
complain when its property :_becomes incumbered
because of its failure to perform that duty.''
. . If, as stated by this court, the legislature did not
intend that collection of water assessments can be defeated or made more difficult by contracts between water
user~, it, to be consistent ·and to giv~ effect to the pur-
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pose and policies of the statute, must hold that the obligation against the water right cannot be avoided· by transfer. In this case it cannot be contended that the Maxfield
Feed & Coal, Incorporated, was a purchaser without
notice of the claim of the State Engineer. Such claim
had been filed with the Receiver as a preferred claim
before Maxfield Feed & Coal, Incorporated, became a
purchaser.
It will be noted that under the language of the statute the remedies of the State Engineer are not stated
in the alternative but are stated cumulatively. The State
Engineer may forbid the use of water and sue for the
amount due. Both remedies have been pursued in an
effort to collect the delinquent water assessment against
the White Fawn right, and it is respectfully. submitted
that either the Receiver must pay the claim in full or the
State Engineer's order forbidding the use of water until
the assessment is paid must b~ enforced.
JOSEPH .CHEZ,
Attorney .General,

G. A. GILES,
· . Assistant . Attorney. General,

E.

J~

SKEEN,

· · -..:·.: · Specia~ Asst .. Attorney General,
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W. W:.RAY,
-

..

·.4:-~t<J~nev :f~~- Amici C'Uri~e._.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

